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ABSTRACT
One well-documented cause of the increase in obesity nationally is the
increased consumption of restaurant and fast food meals. Under the current state of
the law, restaurants are not required to supply nutrition information for their
products similar to manufacturers of processed foods and beverages. Due to this
information gap, leading authorities advocate for increased disclosure of nutrition
information at food service establishments. Jurisdictions around the country are
working to pass menu label laws. This Article explores the First Amendment issues
surrounding such laws.
The Article analyzes First Amendment jurisprudence with regard to
compelled speech and finds that the requirement to disclose factual commercial
information receives less protection than government mandates to disclose facts or
beliefs in other contexts. One value of commercial speech is an informed consumer
population. The compelled disclosure of facts furthers this goal and underlies much
of the consumer protection regulations in the United States. The Article analyzes
menu label laws under the First Amendment and concludes that they are a
constitutionally valid form of commercial disclosure requirement. Public health
necessity dictates that this disclosure requirement become as pervasive and reliable
as information on packaged foods and beverages throughout the country.
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INTRODUCTION
Obesity is a leading public health concern in the United States, showing no
sign of decline.' This reality reflects a drastic shift in consumption and physical
activity patterns over the last several decades.2 One well-documented cause of the
population's escalating body weight is the increased consumption of convenience
food in the form of restaurant and fast food meals.3 The price of fast food remains
inordinately low, but Americans' spending at fast food restaurants rose from $6
billion to $110 billion annually over the last thirty years.4 At restaurants, consumers
in 2005 ate approximately 350 more calories per meal than they did in 1990.
5
Portion sizes exceed United States Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) standards, thereby delivering more calories and encouraging
over-consumption. 6 The number of fast food establishments has also increased
1. See JEFFREY LEVI ET AL., TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, F AS IN FAT: HOW OBESITY
POLICIES ARE FAILING IN AMERICA 3, 5 (2007), available at http://healthyamericans.org/reports/
obesity2007/Obesity2007Report.pdf.
2. See KELLY D. BROWNELL, FOOD FIGHT 1, 7-10 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Jessica L. J. Greenwood & Joseph B. Stanford, Preventing or Improving Obesity by
Addressing Specific Eating Patterns, 21 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 135, 136 (2008); see also Megan A.
McCrory et al., Overeating in America: Association Between Restaurant Food Consumption and Body
Fatness in Healthy Adult Men and Women Ages 19 to 80, 7 OBESITY RES. 564 (1999).
4. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 3 (2001).
5. Heather Patrick & Theresa A. Nicklas, A Review of Family and Social Determinants of
Children's Eating Patterns and Diet Quality, 24 J. AM. C. NUTRITION 83, 85 (2005).
6. Id.; see 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2008); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 2005, at 15 (2005), available at http://www.health.gov/
dietaryguidelines/dga2005/document/pdf/DGA2005.pdf
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exponentially. 7 Parent corporations expanded internationally and now fast food
establishments can be found in more than 120 countries around the world.8 Calorie-
dense foods are more accessible, more convenient, and more frequently consumed
than ever before.
Studies confirm that frequent consumption of restaurant meals, and especially
fast food, is positively associated with increased energy consumption, weight gain,
insulin resistance, and an increased risk for obesity and type two diabetes. 9
Consumption of fast food is specifically associated with a higher intake of calories,
saturated fat, carbohydrates, and added sugars. 10 Experts postulate that weight gain
results because "a single meal from one of these restaurants often contains enough
calories to satisfy a person's caloric requirement for an entire day.""
Unlike manufacturers of processed and pre-packaged foods and beverages,
restaurants are not required to disclose nutrition information for their products
under the current state of the law.'2 At most food service establishments, consumers
have no point of reference to determine the nutrition profile of the products
offered. 13 Without nutrition information, consumers often do not have the ability, or
even the option, to make a choice suitable for their daily calorie and nutrition
requirements. For example, it is not at all obvious that Burger King's
TENDERCRISP Chicken Sandwich is 800 calories, but a Bacon Cheeseburger is
330 calories. 14 Further, a consumer should know that if they order the TRIPLE
7. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 4, at 3-4; see also Brownell, supra note 2, at 8-9. McDonalds
opened a new restaurant every three hours in 1996. Brownell, supra note 2, at 9. It currently has over
31,000 restaurants worldwide. McDonald's Canada, FAQs, http://www.mcdonalds.ca/en/aboutus/
faq.aspx (last visited on Nov. 12, 2009).
8. See McDonald's Canada, supra note 7 (stating that McDonald's operates in more than 199
countries).
9. Shanthy A. Bowman et al., Effects of Fast-Food Consumption on Energy Intake and Diet
Quality Among Children in a National Household Survey, 113 PEDIATRICS 112, 114 (2004); Simone A.
French et al., Fast Food Restaurant Use Among Women in the Pound of Prevention Study: Dietary,
Behavioral and Demographic Correlates, 24 INT'L J. OBESITY 1353, 1357-58 (2000); McCrory et al.,
supra note 3, at 564-71; Mark A. Pereira et al., Fast-Food Habits, Weight Gain, and Insulin Resistance
(the CARDIA Study): 15-Year Prospective Analysis, 365 LANCET 36, 41 (2005).
10. Shanthy A. Bowman & Bryan T. Vinyard, Fast Food Consumption on U.S. Adults: Impact on
Energy and Nutrient Intakes and Overweight Status, 23 J. AM. C. NUTRITION 163, 166-67 (2004).
11. Press Release, Nat'l Insts. of Health, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Eating at Fast-
Food Restaurants More than Twice a Week Is Associated with More Weight Gain and Insulin
Resistance in Otherwise Healthy Young Adults (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.nih.gov/
news/pr/dec2004/nhlbi-30.htm.
12. 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.9(j)(2)(i), 101.10 (2008).
13. See OBESITY WORKING GROUP, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CALORIES COUNT 25 (2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/ac/04/briefing/4039bl0_calories%20count.pdf.
14. Burger King, Burger King USA Nutritionals: November 2009, at 2 (2009), available at
http://www.bk.com/cms/en/us/cms-Out/digital-assets/files/menu-nutrition/NationalNutritionals.pdf.
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WHOPPER Sandwich with Cheese, they are receiving more than half of their daily
calorie requirements at 1250 calories each.
15
Public health necessity dictates that we must add menu labels to the list of
strategies used to address the escalation of obesity in the United States. Calorie and
other information at the point of purchase would assist consumers in making
informed decisions. Without such information, menus alone can be misleading
because price increases for increased portion sizes do not adequately reflect the
percentage increase in calories of the servings.16 Moreover, because consumers are
accustomed to having this information available on packaged products, 7 the
absence of the same on menus can lead to consumer confusion about appropriate
portions.
Due to this information gap, leading public authorities in the United States
advocate for increased disclosure of nutrition information for food and beverages
purchased at food service establishments. The Surgeon General's 2001 Call to
Action to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity recommended
"increas[ing] [the] availability of nutrition information for foods eaten and prepared
away from home."' 18 The Institute of Medicine likewise recommended that "[f]ull-
service and fast food restaurants should expand healthier food options and provide
calorie content and general nutrition information at [the] point of purchase."' 9 In
this vein, the American Medical Association's Resolution of 2007 stated that "our
American Medical Association support[s] federal, state, and local policies to
require fast-food and other chain restaurants. .. to provide consumers with
nutrition information on menus and menu boards. '20 Finally, the FDA Working
Group on Obesity explained that "the pervasiveness of the obesity epidemic means
that more nutrition information must be presented to consumers in restaurant
settings."'2' The FDA recommended "standardized, simple, and understandable
nutritional information, including calorie information, at the point-of-sale ....22
There is virtual unanimity among the nation's medical and public health
organizations on the need to combat obesity by requiring the effective
15. Id. at 1.
16. Declaration of Thomas R. Frieden at 25, N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509
F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 08-Civ-1000 (RJH)).
17. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(2008).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL'S CALL TO ACTION TO
PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 17 (2001).
19. JEFFREY P. KOPLAN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., PREVENTING CHILDHOOD
OBESITY: HEALTH IN THE BALANCE 165-66 (2005).
20. AM. MED. ASS'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, NUTRITION LABELING AND NUTRITIONALLY
IMPROVED MENU OFFERINGS IN FAST FOOD AND OTHER CHAIN RESTAURANTS 2 (2007), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mni/467/419.doc.
21. OBESITY WORKING GROUP, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 13, at 26.
22. Id. at 27.
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communication of factual, nutritional information for food and beverages at food
service establishments.
Based on this consensus, lawmakers around the country have introduced laws
that would require certain food service establishments to disclose nutritional
information about their products at the point of purchase. These laws are typically
referred to as "menu label laws." The point of purchase is most often defined as the
location at which information can be placed directly on the menu or menu board.23
This aims to convey the information to consumers prior to purchase in order to
ensure their access to the information during the decision-making process.24
Most menu label laws target chain restaurants that serve fast food due to
Americans' frequent consumption of fast food and the associated ill-health effects.
The most common requirement of the proposed and passed menu label laws is that
the calorie content of each menu item be placed on the restaurants' menu and/or
menu board. 25 This is based on the theory that calories are considered the most
important consideration for weight control2 6 and consumers are unable to correctly
estimate the calorie content of pre-prepared foods and beverages.2 7 Many
jurisdictions have proposed or passed menu label laws requiring the posting of
additional nutritional information on menus, such as saturated fat, trans fat,
carbohydrates, and/or sodium.2 8
23. See Lisa J. Harnack & Simone A. French, Effect of Point-of-Purchase Calorie Labeling on
Restaurant and Cafeteria Food Choices: A Review of the Literature, 5 INT'L J. BEHAVIORAL NUTRITION
& PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 51, 52 (2008).
24. Id.
25. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094(b)(2) (Deering 2008); NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.,
N.Y. CITY HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2009); KING COUNTY, WAS., KING COUNTY FOOD CODE
§§ 5.02.010, 5.10.015(B)-(C) (2009); see also S.B. 1436, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007); S.B.
686, Leg. 2007, Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2007); B. 17-0139, Leg. 2007 (D.C. 2007); S.B. 1290, Leg. 2007,
185th Sess. (Mass. 2007); S.B. 2264, 212th Leg. (N.J. 2006); H.B. 1203, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.
2007); H.B. 1108, 2007 Leg., Sess. 2007 (Pa. 2007); S.B. 1696, Leg. 2007-2008, 105th Sess. (Tenn.
2007); H.B. 477, 2007-2008 Leg. (Vt. 2008); Legis. Doc. 123-1774, 1st Reg. Sess., at § 2502(2)-(3)
(Me. 2007).
26. See, e.g., OBESITY WORK GROUP, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 13, at 27 ("[A] focus
on total calories is the most useful single piece of information in relation to managing weight .... "); see
also AM. MED. AsS'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 20, at 2 ("[Alt a minimum, calories [should be
labeled] on menu boards, since they have limited space .... ").
27. RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, YALE UNIV., MENU LABELING IN CHAIN
RESTAURANTS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC POLICY 9 (2008), available at
http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/reports/RuddMenuLabelingReport2OO8.pdf;
Scot Burton et al., Attacking the Obesity Epidemic: The Potential Health Benefits of Providing Nutrition
Information in Restaurants, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1669, 1671 (2006).
28. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094(a)(5); PHILA., PA., ORDINANCE 070153
(March 1, 2007); S.B. 1436, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007); B. 17-0139, Leg. 2007 (D.C. 2007);
S.B. 1290, Leg. 2007, 185th Sess. (Mass. 2007); H.B. 1203, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2007); H.B.
1108, 2007 Leg., Sess. 2007 (Pa. 2007), H. 477, 2007-2008 Leg. (Vt. 2008).
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Prominent local jurisdictions around the country have passed menu label
laws, including New York City (NYC),2 9 San Francisco, 30 and Santa Clara,
California.31 However, California recently passed a menu label law that preempted
local efforts, making the ordinances passed in San Francisco and Santa Clara
unenforceable.32 NYC's current menu label law was the first in the country to be
enforced, going into effect on March 31, 2008.33
Originally, the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene sought to
address the city's prevalence of overweight and obesity, thereby addressing highly
correlated diseases, such as heart disease, diabetes, stroke, and cancer, by adopting
Amendment § 81.50 Calorie Labeling to Article 81 of the New York City Health
Code on December 5, 2006.3 4 The New York State Restaurant Association
(NYSRA) challenged the law in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York based on two allegations: that the law was preempted by the
federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), and that the law
violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 5 The court agreed
with the NYSRA that the law was preempted.36 Accordingly, NYC amended its law
to correct the preemption violation and adopted the revised § 81.50 on January 22,
2008. 3' The current law requires that covered food service establishments disclose
29. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50.
30. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE § 468 (2008).
31. SANTA CLARA, CAL., ORDINANCE NS 300.793 (2008).
32. See S.B. 1420, 2008 Leg., 2007-08 Sess. (Cal. 2008) (requiring chain restaurants with twenty
or more outlets in the state to provide detailed written nutrition information at the point-of-sale by July
2009, followed by placement of calorie information on menus and menus boards by January 2011;
exempting drive-thru menu boards from the posting requirement, and preempting local menu labeling
ordinances).
33. See Mark Hamblett, New York City Wins Bid to Force Fast-Food Chains to List Calorie Count
on Menus, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 2008; Roni C. Rabin, Calorie Labels May Clarify Options, Not Actions,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/17/health/nutrition/17cons.html. The New
York City Health Code § 81.50 went into effect on March 31, 2008 but as a result of litigation, the City
could only begin inspecting for compliance after April 30, 2008, and could start seeking fines for non-
compliance after July 19, 2008. See Elissa Elan, NYC's Law Forcing On-Menu Calorie Disclosure
Impels Compliance Plans, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, May 12, 2008.
34. BD. OF HEALTH, N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF
AN AMENDMENT (§81.50) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE 2 (2006), available at
http://yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/policy/NYCityMenuLabelingLaw.pdf. At the time
New York City passed the law, more than half of adults in the city were overweight (34.9%) or obese
(21.7%). Declaration of Thomas R. Frieden, supra note 16, at 4. In 2006, 69.2% of all deaths in New
York City were due to diseases highly correlated with obesity: heart disease, diabetes, stroke, and
cancer. Id. at 5-6.
35. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
36. Id. at 363.
37. BD. OF HEALTH, N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 34, at 1.
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the calorie content of their menu items directly on their menu or menu board.38 The
NYSRA again filed suit, alleging the same defects of the original law. The District
Court found in favor of NYC and ordered covered food service establishments to
comply.39 The NYSRA appealed this decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and, on February 17, 2009, the Court of Appeals
upheld New York City's menu label law. 40 The FDA submitted an amicus brief to
the Court of Appeals supporting affirmance of the District Court's judgment.
Specifically, it argued that the NLEA does not preempt state and local menu label
laws, and that NYC's ordinance does not violate the First Amendment.4
In the First Amendment portion of its memoranda of law in the NYC cases,
the NYSRA alleged that the menu label law impermissibly compelled speech.42
The issues and arguments in that case beg an analysis of First Amendment
jurisprudence with respect to compelled commercial speech. The context of the
NYC menu label dispute provides a sound backdrop for this analysis.
This Article argues that the allegation that menu label laws violate the First
Amendment is unsound in both theory and practice. As a practical matter, menu
label laws are no different from many federal and state laws that require the
disclosure of commercial information-laws that have been universally regarded as
consistent with the First Amendment.43 As a matter of First Amendment theory, the
attack on menu label laws ignores two crucial distinctions: the distinction between
commercial speech and non-commercial speech, and the distinction between laws
that require the disclosure of purely factual information and laws that require a
speaker to express a particular point of view.44 As will be examined below, the
United States Supreme Court's First Amendment cases restrict the government's
ability to compel speakers to state a viewpoint with which they disagree. This is
based on an underlying premise of the First Amendment, which protects the right
of thought and thus the right to not say what is not on one's mind.45 However, the
compulsion to state facts is not as universally protected. In particular, protections
against the compelled disclosure of facts-found in the traditional, non-commercial
38. Id. at 10-11. New York City's revised 2008 menu label law bases compliance on an
establishment being one of a group of 15 or more food service establishments nationally. NEW YORK
CITY, N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50(a)(l) (2008).
39. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 352-53.
40. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 120-23, 137 (2d Cir. 2009).
41. See Brief of the U.S. Food & Drug Admin. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 13-
14, 24-25, N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. May 29, 2008) (No.
08-1892-cv), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/cdp/US-FDA-brief-in-support-
of-court-decision.pdf.
42. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 32-33, N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health,
556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. May 23, 2008) (No. 08-1892-cv).
43. See N. Y State Rest. Ass 'n, 556 F.3d at 131-34; infra Part III.
44. See infra Part V.
45. See infra Part III.
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First Amendment arena--do not extend to mandatory disclosures of fact by
commercial actors.46
The basis for allocating different protection is based on the Supreme Court's
rationale for the limited protection of commercial speech. This outcome turns on
the distinction between traditional speech, where the emphasis is on the autonomy
of the speaker, and commercial speech, where the emphasis is on the receipt of
information by an audience.4 7 Because one value of commercial speech is the
increased amount of information to consumers, the compelled statement of facts
furthers this goal and thus may be permissible. 48 This value underlies much of the
current federal and state disclosure regulations in the United States, which require
companies to disclose certain facts about their products.49
Despite the pervasive and necessary regulatory environment in the United
States, the NYSRA's lawsuit compels analysis of the government's ability to
require the disclosure of such information under the First Amendment. The
NYSRA alleged that NYC's menu label law violated its members' First
Amendment rights.50 However, if a menu label law is a commercial disclosure
requirement similar to those already present in the commercial marketplace, then
the NYSRA's assertion cannot be correct.
Part I of this Article discusses the general protection speech receives under
the First Amendment. Part II briefly covers the constitutional analysis relevant to
restrictions on speech. Part III analyzes First Amendment jurisprudence with regard
to compelled speech. Part IV is dedicated to examining a subset of compelled
speech: factual commercial disclosure requirements. The final part of this Article
applies the commercial speech doctrine to menu label laws. The Article concludes
that menu label laws are a constitutionally valid form of factual disclosure
requirements under the commercial speech doctrine.
I. PROTECTION OF SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging
the freedom of speech."'', This provision embodies the Constitution's "commitment
46. Id.
47. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4
(2000).
48. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
49. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343(i) (2006) (explaining food is misbranded if it does not include the
name of the food and a list of ingredients); 21 U.S.C. § 343(e) (explaining that a food is misbranded if it
is in package form and it does not contain the manufacturer's name and place of business, and the
product weight).
50. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 131-34 (2d Cir. 2009).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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to the free exchange of ideas." 52 The First Amendment affords the broadest
protection to political expression in order "'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.' 53 Although First Amendment protections are not confined to "the
exposition of ideas, 54 "there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."5 5 This reflects our "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. 56 Thus, at
the core of the First Amendment is the protection of ideas, political or otherwise, to
ensure free debate. The rationale is that truth can only prevail if all ideas are tested
in the marketplace of ideas.57 This traditional form of free speech protection is at
the heart of the First Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment as
protecting commercial speech as well. According to the Supreme Court,
"[c]ommercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but
also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information."5 8 In the seminal case of Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Supreme Court explicitly
held that speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction," is
protected by the First Amendment.5 9 Recognizing the distinct value of commercial
speech, the Court explained that the differences "suggest that a different degree of
protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
information is unimpaired., 60 Supreme Court "jurisprudence has emphasized that
'commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,' and is subject to
'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
52. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (quoting Harte-Hanks
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989)).
53. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 14 (1976) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)).
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
56. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254, 270 (1964)).
57. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ....").
58. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980).
59. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)).
60. Id. at 772 n.24.
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expression."' 6 As such, less protection is accorded to commercial speech than
62traditional forms of expression.
Although an exact definition of commercial speech does not exist,63 the
Supreme Court provides guidance on what constitutes commercial speech. The
Court explained that the "commercial speech doctrine rests heavily on 'the
'common-sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction.., and other varieties of speech.'64 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, commercial speech was defined
as an "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience. 65 In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Court looked at whether
the communication at issue was an advertisement, whether it referred to a specific
product or service, and whether the speaker had economic motivations for the
communication, and explained that the combination of these three characteristics
provided strong support for the conclusion that it was commercial speech.66
However, this three-part analysis has not become a constitutional test adhered to by
the Supreme Court in later cases.67 The Court has since differentiated between
"speech for a profit" and "speech that proposes a commercial transaction," the
latter being "what defines commercial speech., 68 The Court defined commercial
speech "even more narrowly, by characterizing the proposal of a commercial
transaction as 'the test for identifying commercial speech.'
69
It is noteworthy that the Court rarely distinguishes "commercial speech" from
"advertising" and tends to use the terms interchangeably. 70 However, it is clear that
not all commercial 'speech is advertising, as understood by popular parlance. The
best example of commercial speech that is not advertising can be found in Rubin v.
61. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)) (emphasis added).
62. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 562-63.
63. See Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 2 CARDOzO L. REV. 2583,
2591-92(2008).
64. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (quoting Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 455-56).
65. 447 U.S. at 561.
66. 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
67. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989).
68. Id. at 482 (emphasis in original).
69. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) (quoting Fox, 492
U.S. at 473-74)).
70. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (classifying
advertisements for legal services as commercial speech and analyzing the case under the court's
commercial speech doctrine). But see Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69 n.31 (1976)
(distinguishing commercial speech from advertising alone, by explaining that "[tihe power of the
Federal Trade Commission to restrain misleading, as well as false, statements in labels and
advertisements has been long recognized") (emphasis added).
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Coors Brewing, where the commercial speech at issue was a beer label.7 The
respondent in this case argued that the Federal Alcohol Administration Act's ban
on the displaying of alcohol content on beer labels violated the First Amendment's
protection of commercial speech.72 In Justice Stevens' concurrence, he referred to
the Surgeon General's Warning labels on cigarettes, and labeling requirements for
food and drug products as commercial speech,73 yet none of these labels are forms
of advertising.
74
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
First Amendment protection of traditional speech, which has been referred to
as "public discourse, 75 is the most robust because it is related to a citizen's right to
freely participate "in the process of democratic self-governance." 76 Commercial
speech, on the other hand, "consists of communication about commercial matters
that conveys information necessary for public decision making, but that does not
itself form part of public discourse. 77 Commercial speech differs from traditional
speech mainly "because it is constitutionally valued for the information it
disseminates, rather than for being itself a valuable way of participating in
democratic self-determination. 78 Thus, although in the context of traditional
speech, the First Amendment protects against state intrusions on the right to speak
and the right to remain silent, this principle does not entirely translate to the context
of commercial speech.
First Amendment jurisprudence is well-established for government mandated
restrictions on speech. The Supreme Court developed specific tests to scrutinize
government mandates that implicate the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech. In the realm of traditional, non-commercial speech, a restriction on speech
is subject to strict scrutiny if it discriminates against constitutionally protected
speech based on its content. 79 For example, in Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that banned certain types
of peaceful picketing, but not others, as violating the First Amendment because any
71. 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 492 n.I (Stevens, J., concurring).
74. See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 472 (explaining that the commercial speech at issue was
"Tupperware parties" which "consist[ed] of demonstrating and offering products for sale to groups of 10
or more prospective buyers at gatherings assembled and hosted by one of those prospective buyers
.... ").
75. See Post, supra note 47, at 4 (citing Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995);
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. But see United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (asserting that the First
Amendment does not fully protect some categories of speech, such as obscenity and "fighting words").
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"restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut
the 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' 80 This is because the government
cannot "restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content., 81 Thus, if the restriction is "content-based" and subject to the strict
scrutiny test, it is only valid if it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and it is narrowly tailored to that end. Government restrictions rarely meet this
test.
8 2
On the other hand, a "content-neutral" regulation is one that does not target
expression according to its content, meaning that the government's justification for
the regulation is made "without reference to the content of the regulated speech. 83
For example, in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, an
ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property was found to be
content-neutral because the ordinance prohibited the posting of all signs regardless
of their content. 84 In cases such as this, courts apply an intermediate level of
scrutiny, which seeks to balance government interests against the right of free
expression.85 Content-neutral regulations that implicate expressive conduct are
sustained if they are "shown to further an important or substantial governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, provided the incidental
restrictions [do] not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further'
those interests.,, 86 Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are also
valid if they are "designed to serve a substantial government interest and do not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. 87
Restrictions on commercial speech are not analyzed under the tests reserved
for restrictions on traditional speech discussed directly above, but rather under an
intermediate test set forth in Central Hudson.88 The intermediate nature of the test
reflects the subordinate position that commercial speech holds under the First
80. 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
81. Id. at 95.
82. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 65 (1983) ("With respect to noncommercial speech, this Court has sustained content-based
restrictions only in the most extraordinary circumstances.").
83. Boos, 485 U.S. at 320 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
84. 466 U.S. 789, 791 & n.I, 804 (1984).
85. Id. at 804-05 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) ("[A] government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it ... furthers an important or substantial governmental interest ...
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.")).
86. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 520 U.S. 180, 186 (1997) (quoting Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)); see also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
87. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,47 (1986).
88. 447 U.S. 557, 561-63 (1980).
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Amendment. Although the application of this test to all commercial speech
restrictions has been challenged by several Justices, 89 Central Hudson remains
good law. 90 The Central Hudson test consists of four prongs. Courts must first
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment, meaning
that it must relate to a lawful activity and not be false, deceptive, or misleading.
9 1
Courts must then determine whether the government asserted a substantial interest
in restricting the speech, whether the restriction directly advances that interest, and
"whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. ' 92
First Amendment doctrine is less developed in the area of compelled speech,93
as explored below. In the traditional speech arena, the First Amendment strictly
protects against state intrusions on the right to remain silent, just as it protects the
right to speak. However, this parallel does not exist in the realm of commercial
speech.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF COMPELLED SPEECH
A. Traditional Speech
Under the First Amendment, there is a "constitutional equivalence of
compelled speech and compelled silence in the context of fully protected
expression ..... ,94 This interpretation is based on the underlying "principle that
'[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking 'are complementary
components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' ' 95 The
Supreme Court explained that "at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion
that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced
by the State."96 This right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment
89. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) ("Admittedly, several
Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should
apply in particular cases.") (citations omitted).
90. See id. at 554-55 ("But here, as in Greater New Orleans, we see 'no need to break new ground.
Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for
decision."') (citation omitted); Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment's Application to
Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 789, 794 (2007).
91. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
92. Id.
93. See Post, supra note 47, at 2 (noting that the commercial speech doctrine, which is intertwined
with the compelled speech doctrine, is a "notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First
Amendment jurisprudence").
94. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
95. Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
96. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).
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includes the right to refrain from speaking if such coerced speech is contradictory
to one's own beliefs.97
This concept is highlighted in the cases of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette98 and Wooley v. Maynard.99 In Barnette, the Supreme Court
struck down a state law requiring public school children to participate in a
compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance. 100 The Court explained that the
First Amendment does not permit public authorities to compel an individual "to
utter what is not on his or her mind."''1 1 Likewise, in Wooley, the Court analyzed a
New Hampshire law making it a misdemeanor for its citizens to obscure the motto
"Live Free or Die" on their license plates. 10 2 Relying on Barnette, the Court
decided that New Hampshire could not require its citizens to use their own private
property "as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message."'0 3 The Court
found that the law unconstitutionally forced individuals "to be an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable.' 0 4 Thus, the State cannot force its citizens to foster a point of view
contrary to their own beliefs.
The right to be free from coerced speech in the traditional First Amendment
realm is not limited to compulsions of subjective beliefs. The case of Riley v.
National Federation of the Blind suggests that in the realm of traditional speech,
the First Amendment protects against compulsory factual statements as well.1
0 5
Riley involved a state law governing the solicitation of charitable contributions.1
0 6
The law required that professional fundraisers disclose the percentage of charitable
contributions that were actually turned over to the charity.'0 7 Riley must be
understood in the charitable solicitation context because the speech at issue was a
combination of fully protected speech with components of commercial speech
which are "inextricably intertwined."' ' Because the individual components cannot
be parceled out, the Court confirmed that charitable solicitation regulations must be
97. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714; see also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256
(1974) (arguing that requiring a newspaper company to publish material without a choice is
unconstitutional).
98. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
99. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
100. 319 U.S. at 625, 642.
101. Id. at 634, 642.
102. 430 U.S. at 706-07.
103. Id. at 715.
104. Id.
105. 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
106. Id. at 784.
107. Id. at 795.
108. Id. at 796; see Sec'y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959 (1984); see also
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (explaining that the Court has not
treated charitable solicitation as purely a form of commercial speech).
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analyzed under the test for fully protected expression.'0 9 Thus, the Court decided
that in the realm of traditional speech, cases like Wooley and Barnette "cannot be
distinguished simply because they involved compelled statements of opinion while
here we deal with compelled statements of 'fact': either form of compulsion
burdens protected speech."" 0 As such, the mandate at issue was found to violate
the First Amendment."' Riley lends insight into the Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment protection against the compulsion to disclose facts in the realm of
fully protected speech. Thus, although not directly in line with other cases
protecting core First Amendment values, the Court aligned charitable contribution
cases with the interests in the traditional speech arena against the compulsion to
speak beliefs, viewpoints, and facts.
B. Commercial Speech
First Amendment protection is not as broad in the context of commercial
speech. In the seminal case of Virginia Pharmacy, the Court explained that the
"hardiness of commercial speech" may "make it appropriate to require that a
commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional information,
warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.""' 2 Since
then, the first case analyzing such a commercial speech mandate was Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.' 3
In Zauderer, the Court considered a state requirement that attorney
advertisements for contingent-fee representation disclose whether percentages were
computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses because the "failure
to inform clients that they would be liable for costs (as opposed to legal fees) even
if their claims were unsuccessful rendered the advertisement 'deceptive. ' 114 The
Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint against attorney Zauderer
for, among other things, failing to comply with this disclosure requirement.' '5 The
Court made it clear that, although the compulsion to speak can violate the First
Amendment in the realm of traditional speech, this is not the case in the
commercial speech arena because:
109. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
110. Id. at 797-98.
111. Id. at 795, 803.
112. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24
(1976).
113. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). The Court addressed commercial speech mandates several decades before
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, but it was not recognized as a commercial speech case at the time.
See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (considering whether compelled
monetary contributions to political causes by members of a union violated the First Amendment); Riley,
487 U.S. at 796-98 (determining that when generally commercial speech is intertwined with other
protected speech elements, the Court's test for fully protected expression must apply).
114. 471 U.S. at 633, 632 n.4.
115. Id. at 631-33.
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The interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those
discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not attempted to
"prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein." The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be
orthodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the
form of a requirement that appellant include in his advertising purely
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which his
services will be available.
16
Therefore, the Court held that the factual disclosure requirement should neither be
analyzed under the strict scrutiny test reserved for restrictions or compulsions of
traditional speech, nor should it be analyzed under the intermediate test for
restrictions of commercial speech under Central Hudson."7 The requirement to
disclose factual commercial information was instead analyzed under the most
lenient constitutional test: the reasonable relationship test. 18 Under the reasonable
relationship test, the Court looked at whether the regulation bore a reasonable
relationship to the government's stated interest in passing the regulation, and as
such, the mandate at issue was found to be constitutional. 19
It is noteworthy that the Riley Court differentiated Zauderer from the
charitable solicitation case by saying, "[p]urely commercial speech is more
susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements."' 2 ° Unlike the factual disclosure
requirements at issue in Riley, factual disclosure requirements in the commercial
speech arena must only meet the reasonable relationship test. One reason for this is
the purpose of the reduced protection for commercial speech and the value such
information has in the commercial marketplace. 12 1 In Central Hudson, the Court
explained:
In most other contexts, the First Amendment prohibits regulation based
on the content of the message. Two features of commercial speech
permit regulation of its content. First, commercial speakers have
extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they
are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the
116. Id. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
117. Id. ("[W]e hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.")
(emphasis added); see also supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny in the
realm of commercial speech); supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson
intermediate test).
118. See id.; see also Recent Development, Attorney Advertising and Commercial Speech After
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 21 TULSA L.J. 591, 602-03 (1986) (explaining how the
holding in Zauderer established a more lenient First Amendment test).
119. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651-53.
120. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 n.9 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
121. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Zauderer, 471
U.S at 651.
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lawfulness of the underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech,
the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression
that is not "particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad
regulation.' ' 2
Because the commercial speaker has access to the facts regarding their products
and services, inaccurate statements of fact are not protected by the First
Amendment and the disclosure of accurate factual information may be compelled.
In Zauderer, the Court explained that because "the extension of First Amendment
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers
of the information such speech provides," the commercial actor's "constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his
advertising is minimal."' 123 This is why the State may require a commercial actor
"to provide somewhat more information than they might otherwise be inclined to
present."1
24
In the case of NYSRA v. NYC Board of Health, the restaurant industry argued
that Zauderer's reasonable relationship test was limited to preventing consumer
confusion or deception. 25 Although menu label laws and other disclosure
requirements do prevent consumer confusion or deception because the absence of
such information can make the sale of the target product misleading, 126 NYSRA's
argument is a misinterpretation of Zauderer. This reading incorrectly collapses the
analysis of the first prong of the Central Hudson test with the reasonable
relationship test applicable to commercial disclosure requirements.
In Zauderer, the Court's language announcing its holding led to the
NYSRA's misunderstanding of the import of the case. Specifically, the Court held
that although "unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might
offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech ... an
advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers." 27
122. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) (citations
omitted).
123. 471 U.S. at 651 (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 650.
125. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Declaratory Relief
and Partial Summary Judgment at 22-23, 33, 36-38, N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health,
509 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. c-05710).
126. See generally Burton et al., supra note 27, at 1674 ("[T]he provision of easily accessible
nutrition information may provide significant public health benefits by making it easier for consumers to
make more healthful food choices."); Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Kelly D. Brownell, Legal and Public
Health Considerations Affecting the Success, Reach, and Impact of Menu-Labeling Laws, 98 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1578, 1579 (2008) ("Menu labels provide one tool for customers to make more-informed
decisions and reduce the current confusion over portion sizes and the calorie and nutrition content of
restaurant food.").
127. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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Stating it another way, the Court explained that "because disclosure requirements
trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on
speech, '[warnings] or [disclaimers] might be appropriately required ... in order to
dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.' 128 Due to these
statements, Zauderer was misinterpreted by the NYSRA to mean that only these
state interests (preventing consumer confusion or deception) are viable to support a
factual disclosure requirement. 129 Rather than addressing consumer confusion or
governmental interests, Zauderer analyzed whether the State could compel speech
through commercial disclosure requirements. 130 If a menu label law is considered a
routine factual disclosure requirement,' 13 then Zauderer's reasonable relationship
test must control the analysis of whether the government's stated interest is
reasonably related to the institution of such a law.
The correct reading of the passages above is that in Zauderer, the disclosure
requirement was reasonably related to the government's interest in that case:
avoiding misleading voluntary advertisements by attorneys. In Virginia Pharmacy,
the Court foresaw the potential for confusing or deceptive advertising by certain
professionals:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of
commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no
opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and
functional, between professions, may require consideration of quite
different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense
standardized products; they render professional services of almost
infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for
confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of
advertising. 132
The fact that Zauderer's disclosure requirement was validated for this reason
reflects the Court's special concern for the possibility of deception in the realm of
professional advertisement. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, a case involving
attorney advertising, the Court made a similar statement: "We do not foreclose the
possibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or
the like might be required of even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so
as to assure that the consumer is not misled."' 33
The Supreme Court has paid particular attention to speech in the professional
advertisement context. The Court has explained that "advertising by the professions
128. Id. (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).
129. See Reply Memorandum, supra note 125, at 22-23, 33, 35-38.
130. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 627.
131. See infra Part V.
132. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25
(1976) (emphasis in original).
133. 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
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poses special risks of deception-'because the public lacks sophistication
concerning legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed
unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal
advertising.' 134 Thus, in the professional advertising context, courts often talk in
terms of inherently misleading speech, which is not protected by the First
Amendment and can be prohibited entirely. 135 In Zauderer, the Court spoke of the
omission in terms reminiscent of "inherently misleading" professional advertising
cases:
The assumption that substantial numbers of potential clients would be so
misled is hardly a speculative one: it is a commonplace that members of
the public are often unaware of the technical meanings of such terms as
"fees" and "costs"--terms that, in ordinary usage, might well be
virtually interchangeable. When the possibility of deception is as self-
evident as it is in this case, we need not require the State to "conduct a
survey of the ... public before it [may] determine that the
[advertisement] had a tendency to mislead." The State's position that it
is deceptive to employ advertising that refers to contingent-fee
arrangements without mentioning the client's liability for costs is
reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding
the client's liability for costs be disclosed.
136
However, by definition, inherently misleading speech cannot be cured by
disclosure requirements. Zauderer is not a case about curing misleading speech, but
rather a case about the constitutionality of a disclosure requirement . 37 Thus, the
Court did not need to consider which type of misleading speech the statute was
designed to cure; rather, it only needed to determine whether the disclosure
requirement was reasonably related to the state's goal. 1
38
The NYSRA's reading would place Zauderer in the context of the first prong
of the Central Hudson test, which requires courts to ask whether the speech is
protected by the First Amendment, meaning it is not misleading or about unlawful
activity. 139 There is a clear distinction between mandating the disclosure of
commercial facts and curing potentially misleading speech. The former is
134. In re R. M. J., 455 U.S 191, 200 (1982) (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383).
135. Id. at 203 ("[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is
inherently misleading . . . , the States may impose appropriate restrictions [and it] may be prohibited
entirely.").
136. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652-53 (1985) (quoting Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965)).
137. See id. at 629.
138. Id. at 651.
139. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
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commonplace in the current consumer protection regulatory scheme in the U.S. 1 4 0
The latter is a judicial cure for potentially misleading speech.'14
It also cannot be that all compelled disclosure requirements must be
reasonably related to only one government interest-that of avoiding consumer
confusion or deception. This reading would mean that the type of speech
determines whether the government interest is constitutional. This is not a logical
reading as it is for the government entity to define its interest and not the law to
tailor a particular interest to be had.142 Further, as explored below, labels on food,
beverage and textile products are a form of commercial speech that put more
information in the commercial marketplace because the absence of this information
can be confusing, deceptive, or just plain incomplete. United States Courts of
Appeal that have considered this argument have interpreted Zauderer as applying
to compelled disclosure requirements enacted for other purposes. 43 The result of
the NYSRA's argument would be that all commercial disclosure requirements are
constitutionally suspect. This is not only incorrect, but unfeasible.144
C. Compelled Subsidization of Speech Cases
Although not directly in line with straightforward commercial speech cases,
the Court found that a state-mandated requirement to financially contribute to
speech contrary to one's beliefs violates the First Amendment in the case of United
States Department of Agriculture v. United Foods.145 United Foods involved a
Congressional Act establishing the Mushroom Council, which was authorized to
impose mandatory assessments upon handlers of fresh mushrooms. 146 Because the
main goal of the scheme was to pay for advertisements, 147 the Supreme Court
addressed whether the government may "sponsor speech with a certain viewpoint
using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of persons, some of whom
140. See infra Part IV.
141. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) ("To the extent
that potentially misleading statements of private certification or specialization could confuse consumers,
a State might consider screening certifying organizations or requiring a disclaimer about the certifying
organization or the standards of a specialty. A State may not, however, completely ban statements that
are not actually or inherently misleading ....") (citation omitted).
142. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining how "[tihe
government's purpose is the controlling consideration").
143. See infra notes 211-229 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "[tihe
right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not such a
fundamental right").
145. 533 U.S. 405, 408-10, 416 (2001).
146. Id. at 408; see Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-624, §§ 1921, 1925(b)-(g), 104 Stat. 3854, 3854, 3857-60.
147. See Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act §1922(b).
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object to the idea being advanced., 148 One handler of fresh mushrooms challenged
the assessments, contending the "forced subsidy for generic advertising" violated
its First Amendment rights because it wanted to convey the message that its brand
of mushrooms was superior to those grown by other producers. The handler also
objected to being charged for a message that mushrooms are worth consuming
whether or not they are branded. 149 Because the forced subsidization was for speech
of a "viewpoint" contrary to the handler's "beliefs," the scheme was held to violate
the handler's First Amendment right not to participate in speech contrary to its own
interests.
50
United Foods stands for the proposition that the government cannot require a
speaker to subsidize a controversial viewpoint. This case is part of the compelled
subsidy of speech line of cases, but it is the closest Supreme Court case addressing
the compelled statement of beliefs in the commercial context.' 5' The Court recalled
past compelled subsidization of speech cases like Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education 152 and Keller v. State Bar of California153 that likewise "recognized a
First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization
whose expressive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief.' ' 154 The Court
did not state which level test it applied to the mandate in United Foods, but based
on its precedent, one would expect that an intermediate test would apply. There are
no cases in which the Court applied strict scrutiny in the realm of commercial
speech,155 and the application of the reasonable relationship test implies that the
law would pass First Amendment scrutiny.
What has emerged is a clear distinction between the government's ability to
compel facts and beliefs under the commercial speech doctrine. Relevant to this
distinction is another compelled subsidization of speech case decided prior to
United Foods: Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.156 In that case, a fruit
148. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 410.
149. Id. at 409,411.
150. Id. at 412-16.
151. See id. at 410 ("Just as the First Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting
speech, the Amendment may prevent the government from compelling individuals to express certain
views, or from compelling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object.")
(citations omitted). See also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (explaining
that the issue in this compelled subsidy of speech case was "whether the generic advertising at issue
[wa]s the government's own speech and therefore is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny");
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 460, 474 (1997) (holding that the challenge to
assessments imposed on respondents for generic advertising did not warrant First Amendment scrutiny).
152. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
153. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
154. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413 (quoting Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471) (internal quotation
omitted).
155. Cf Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995) (explaining that the Supreme
Court uses "intermediate" scrutiny-not strict scrutiny-to analyze restrictions on commercial speech).
156. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
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producer challenged certain provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act, which Congress enacted to establish and maintain market conditions and fair
prices for agricultural commodities.' 57 Of the collective activities that Congress
authorized, the fruit producer challenged the compulsion to fund advertising of the
commodities subject to the broader collective enterprise. 158 Because the financial
contribution for advertising in this case was "germane" to a larger regulatory
regime, the Court found that it did not violate the First Amendment, 159 unlike in
United Foods, where the contributions were being excised for the speech itself.
60
However, there is an important distinction between these two cases that often
goes unrecognized. In United Foods, the Court found that the compelled message
was contrary to the producer's interests and beliefs,' 6' but in Glickman, the scheme
at issue was for "factually accurate advertising."' 162 The Glickman Court found that
the producer's "criticisms of generic advertising provide no basis for concluding
that factually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgment of anybody's right to
speak freely.' '163 Thus, the compulsion to pay for "factually accurate advertising"
was found not to violate the First Amendment. 64 Unlike in United Foods, where
the compulsion to subsidize a message was one with which the commercial actor
disagreed, 65 in Glickman the Court explained that requiring the producer to pay the
assessments "cannot be said to engender any crisis of conscience.' 66 Therefore, the
Court allowed the government to compel contributions for a scheme that included
factually accurate advertising. 67 Because United Foods explicitly held that
Glickman was good law, the Court sustained the government's ability to require the
subsidization of a regulatory regime that includes the advertisement of factually
accurate generic messages, in contrast to the subsidization of viewpoints contrary
to one's own.' 68 By accepting the validity of Glickman, United Foods implicitly
acknowledges that the government can compel commercial speech for reasons
other than the avoidance of deception, as alleged by the NYSRA in NYSRA, 69
157. Id. at 460-61; Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 246
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 602(1) (2006)).
158. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469.
159. Id. at 469, 477.
160. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410, 413 (2001).
161. Id. at 413.
162. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 474.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410.
166. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 472.
167. Id. at 474,477.
168. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410-13.
169. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Relief and Preliminary
Injunction at 23, N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (No. c-05710).
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given that Glickman did not depend upon the avoidance of deception for its factual
speech mandate.17
0
D. The Fact/Belief Distinction Realized
The rationale for treating statements of fact and those of belief differently
underlies basic principles of the First Amendment. As examined above, the First
Amendment protects "the right of freedom of thought"'171 which means a person
cannot be compelled "to utter what is not in his mind." 72 Because this is a core
First Amendment value, the Court seems to extend the protection to all speakers.
There is no constitutional value to compelling statements antagonistic to one's
beliefs in either the realm of traditional speech or that of commercial speech.
However, this First Amendment guarantee is not implicated by compelled
disclosures of factual information about the products or services being offered in
the commercial marketplace. These factual disclosures are "necessary to insure ...
the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information."' 7 3 In the commercial
marketplace, the emphasis is on the receipt of information by consumers, thus the
compelled disclosure of facts is valued.
This distinction was noted in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, where the Supreme Court stated that "[a]lthough the
State may at times 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising' by
requiring the dissemination of 'purely factual and uncontroversial information,'
outside that context it may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the
speaker disagrees."' 174 Further, in the case of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of California, the Court found that while the Utilities
Commission may order the public utility to carry factual legal notices such as
"changes in the way rates are calculated," it cannot force the corporation "to carry
the messages of third parties, where the messages themselves are biased against or
are expressly contrary to the corporation's views."' 175 The Court was clear that the
State could not require corporations to carry the political messages of third parties
at issue in the case. 176 However, the Court cited Zauderer for the proposition that
the "State, of course, has substantial leeway in determining appropriate information
disclosure requirements for business corporations."'
' 77
170. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 476-77.
171. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
172. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).
173. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
174. 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (citations omitted).
175. 475 U.S. 1,4, 15 n.12 (1986).
176. Id. at 4-5, 9, 14-15.
177. Id. at 15 n.12.
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit engaged in a
similar analysis in Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich.178 There, the
court reviewed a state law that required video game retailers to place labels on
games saying 18 or sexually explicit, put signs in their stores, and provide
brochures to customers explaining the video game rating system. 17 9 The question
before the court was whether the "labeling and signage requirements are compelled
speech in violation of the Constitution or simply requirements of purely factual
disclosures."' 180 The court explained that "in the commercial arena, the Constitution
permits the State to require speakers to express certain messages without their
consent, the most prominent examples being warning and nutritional information
labels. '18' The Court found, however, that the law in question violated the First
Amendment because the State's definition of sexually explicit was "opinion-
based."' 8 2 Moreover, "the requirement that the '18' sticker be attached to all games
meeting the State's definition forces the game-seller to include this non-factual
information in its message that is the game's packaging. The sticker ultimately
communicates a subjective and highly controversial message-that the game's
content is sexually explicit."' 83 Relying on Pacific Gas & Electric, the court
distinguished the subjective message at hand from the Surgeon General's warning
of the carcinogenic properties of cigarettes and a mercury disclosure requirement
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 184 Unlike the
law at issue in Blagojevich, these latter factual disclosure requirements mandated
the disclosure of factual information, not subjective beliefs, about the products
sold.
Thus, commercial factual disclosure requirements were differentiated from
compelled statements of belief The rationale behind the First Amendment
protection for commercial speech is to increase the dissemination of information in
the commercial marketplace. Guaranteeing the government's ability to compel
more commercial information serves this purpose.
IV. COMPELLED COMMERCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Compelled commercial disclosure requirements are a subset of commercial
speech. Their value is based on the value of commercial speech to the commercial
marketplace. As the Court stated in Virginia Pharmacy:
178. 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
179. Id. at 643.
180. Id. at 652.
181. Id. at 651.
182. Id. at 652.
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d. 104 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. 85
The early commercial speech cases overturned restrictions on speech based on the
First Amendment principle that "people will perceive their own best interests if
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open
the channels of communication rather than close them.' 86 The Court reiterated this
concept by stating that the "disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more
likely to make a positive contribution to decision-making than is concealment of
such information."'' 8 7 This principle underlies compelled disclosure mandates of
factual information in the commercial marketplace.
Commercial disclosure requirements are a routine part of the current
regulatory scheme in the United States. As early as 1919, the Supreme Court stated
that "it is too plain for argument that a manufacturer or vendor has no constitutional
right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser fair information of what it is that
is being sold."' 88 Due to an absence of voluntary and uniform disclosures, the
government often requires commercial actors to disclose "purely factual and
uncontroversial information"'189 about their products or services to ensure that the
public is well-informed.
In 1966, Congress enacted the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.' 90 The
Congressional declaration of the policy underlying the Act states:
Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of
a free market economy. Packages and their labels should enable
consumers to obtain accurate information as to the quantity of the
contents and should facilitate value comparisons. Therefore, it is hereby
declared to be the policy of the Congress to assist consumers and
manufacturers in reaching these goals in the marketing of consumer
goods.' 9'
185. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
186. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
770).
187. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994) (quoting Peel v.
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n., 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990)); see also, Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980) ("Commercial expression not only
serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest
in the fullest possible dissemination of information.").
188. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431 (1919).
189. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
190. Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966).
191. Id. § 2.
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This policy rationale underlies countless laws aimed at making information
available to consumers. For example, textile and wool products must be labeled
with their fiber content, country of origin, and the identity of the business
responsible for marketing or handling the item. 192 Articles of apparel made of fur
must be labeled with the English name of the animal from which the fur was taken
and whether the fur is dyed or previously used.193 Cosmetics must have an
information panel that lists the products' ingredients in descending order of
predominance. 194 Similarly, packaged food and beverages must list the ingredients
contained in the product, 195 the net weight of the contents, 196 and the alcohol
content.197 All foods regulated by the FDA must have labels that identify the source
of all ingredients that are, or are derived from, the eight most common food
allergens (milk, eggs, fish, crustacean shellfish, tree nuts, peanuts, wheat, and
soybeans). 198 Federal law also requires that information on lead-based paint hazards
must be disclosed before the sale or lease of residential housing built before
1978.199
Labeling requirements further the goal that the free market economy
functions fairly and efficiently through well informed consumers. Commercial
disclosure requirements are specifically enacted to promote fair dealings, better
informed decision-making, and fair and efficient commercial markets. Such laws
are reasonably related to the government's interest in regulating for public
health,200 safety20 1 and an informed consumer population.
20 2
Besides Zauderer, few Supreme Court cases mention the First Amendment
issues relevant to compelled disclosure requirements in the commercial
marketplace.20 3 One of the few cases that touch on commercial disclosure mandates
is Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company.20 4 In that case, the Court struck down a
192. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 68(b), 70(b) (2006).
193. See id. § 69(b), (e).
194. 21 C.F.R. § 701.3 (2008).
195. 21 U.S.C. § 343(i) (2006).
196. Id. § 343(e).
197. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (2006).
198. 21 U.S.C. § 343(w).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 4852(d) (2006).
200. See Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1916) (explaining that a State
may exercise its police power in protecting public health).
201. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1915) (stating how the police power of the State
includes regulations designed to promote public safety).
202. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-65
(1976) (asserting that society has an interest in consumers make well informed and intelligent
commercial decisions).
203. See generally R. Michael Hoefges, Regulating Professional Services Advertising: Current
Parameters and Issues Under the First Amendment Commercial Speech Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 953, 975-83 (2007) (interpreting the holding in Zauderer in ensuing cases).
204. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
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section of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA) that prohibited beer
labels from displaying alcohol content. 0 5 The Court explained that a beer label
constitutes commercial speech and thus the government could not prohibit the
manufacturer from putting factual information about its product on the label.20 6 The
FAAA mandated the disclosure of alcohol content for some beverages,0 7 and
Justice Stevens briefly addressed this compelled commercial speech mandate in his
concurring opinion. Justice Stevens stated that in the commercial context, the
government "often requires affirmative disclosures that the speaker might not make
voluntarily., 20 8 In the accompanying footnote, Stevens cited several United States
Code provisions that require commercial actors to label their products for the
purpose of providing consumers with information: "15 U.S.C. § 1333 (requiring
"Surgeon General's Warning" labels on cigarettes); 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1988 ed. and
Supp. V) (setting labeling requirements for food products); 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1988
ed. and Supp. V) (setting labeling requirements for drug products)."20 9 These
labeling requirements are examples of commercial disclosure mandates that are
reasonably related to the government's interest in regulating for public health,
safety, and an informed consumer population.210
United States Courts of Appeal consistently find factual disclosure
requirements constitutional under the reasonable relationship test. In the United
States Court of Appeal for the First Circuit case of Pharmaceutical Care
Management Association v. Rowe, the court considered a trade association's
challenge to a state statute that would require its members (PBMs) to disclose
certain factual information in order to enter contracts with covered entities.2 11 The
association alleged that the disclosure requirements violated the First Amendment
rights of its members by impermissibly compelling commercial speech in the
context of a voluntary business relationship.212 The court found that the plaintiffs
claim was without merit and explained:
What is at stake here... is simply routine disclosure of economically
significant information designed to forward ordinary regulatory
purposes-in this case, protecting covered entities from questionable
PBM business practices. There are literally thousands of similar
regulations on the books-such as product labeling laws, environmental
spill reporting, accident reports by common carriers, SEC reporting as to
corporate losses and (most obviously) the requirement to file tax returns
205. Id. at 478.
206. Id. at 481, 483.
207. Federal Alcohol Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 74-401, § 5(e)(2), 49 Stat. 977, 982 (1935).
208. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 492 (Stevens, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 492 n.l.
210. See id. at 485 (majority opinion), 492 (Stevens, J., concurring).
211. 429 F.3d 294, 298-99 (1st Cir. 2005).
212. Id.
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to government units who use the information to the obvious
disadvantage of the taxpayer.
The idea that these thousands of routine regulations require an
extensive First Amendment analysis is mistaken. Zauderer makes clear
'that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing
deception of consumers.' This is a test akin to the general rational basis
test governing all government regulations under the Due Process
Clause. The test is so obviously met in this case as to make elaboration
pointless.213
Thus, Rowe stands for the proposition that the government can compel factual
information from commercial actors. The court found that Zauderer affirms that
commercial disclosure requirements must meet the rational relationship test2t 4 and
regulations such as those set forth above clearly do.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit came to the same
conclusion in National Electrical Manufacturers Association v. Sorrell.215 In that
case, the court considered a State requirement that manufacturers of certain
mercury-containing products label their products and packaging to inform
consumers that the products contain mercury and should be disposed of properly.2 16
The court explained that the First Amendment is satisfied "by a rational connection
between the purpose of a commercial disclosure requirement and the means
employed to realize that purpose."'2 17 In upholding the commercial disclosure
requirement, the court said: "To be sure, the compelled disclosure at issue here was
not intended to prevent 'consumer confusion or deception' per se, Zauderer, but
rather to better inform consumers about the products they purchase. 2t 8 The court
explained that "[b]y encouraging such changes in consumer behavior, the labeling
requirement is rationally related to the state's goal of reducing mercury
contamination., 219 In fact, it went on to note "the potentially wide-ranging
implications" of finding otherwise:
Innumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the disclosure
of product and other commercial information. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434
(reporting of federal election campaign contributions); 15 U.S.C. § 781
(securities disclosures); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (tobacco labeling); 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(q)(1) (nutritional labeling); 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (reporting of
213. Id. at 316 (Boudin, J., concurring) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985)) (noting that the joint concurring opinion of Chief Judge Boudin and Judge Dyk
represented the opinion of the court with respect to the First Amendment issues) (emphasis added).
214. Id.
215. 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
216. Id. at 107.
217. Id. at 115.
218. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
219. Id.
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pollutant concentrations in discharges to water); 42 U.S.C. § 11023
(reporting of releases of toxic substances); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1
(disclosures in prescription drug advertisements); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200 (posting notification of workplace hazards); Cal. Health &
Safety Code § 25249.6 ("Proposition 65"; warning of potential exposure
to certain hazardous substances); N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 33-0707
(disclosure of pesticide formulas). To hold that the Vermont statute is
insufficiently related to the state's interest in reducing mercury pollution
would expose these long-established programs to searching scrutiny by
unelected courts. Such a result is neither wise nor constitutionally
required.22 °
Like the laws delineated by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Rowe, the
regulations referred to above are commercial disclosure regulations that are
rationally related to the government's interest in a properly functioning marketplace
where consumers have necessary information to make informed choices.
Finally, in the case of Environmental Defense Center v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit responded to challenges to certain regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Clean Water Act dealing with pollution from stormwater runoff.2 1 One of the
regulations compels municipalities (MS4s) to "distribute educational materials to
the community" about the impacts of stormwater discharges on water bodies and
explain measures the public can take to reduce pollutants and to "[i]nform public
employees, businesses, and the general public of hazards associated with illegal
discharges and improper disposal of waste. 222 The court rejected the MS4s' claim
that these sections violated their First Amendment right not to deliver EPA's
political message.223 The court explained that the interests at stake are not political
like those in Wooley and Barnette. On the contrary:
Informing the public about safe toxin disposal is non-ideological; it
involves no 'compelled recitation of a message' and no 'affirmation of
belief.' It does not prohibit the MS4 from stating its own views about
the proper means of managing toxic materials, or even about the Phase
II Rule itself. Nor is the MS4 prevented from identifying its
dissemination of public information as required by federal law, or from
220. Id. at 116. This case is controlling in the recent decision in New York State Rest. Ass'n v. New
York City Board of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132-34 (2d Cir. 2009), which allowed the expansion of
required nutritional labeling.
221. 344 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2003).
222. Id. at 848 (quoting 40 C.F.R § 122.34(b)(1)(i), (b)(3)(ii)(D) (2000)).
223. Id. at 848-51.
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making available federally produced informational materials on the
subject and identifying them as such.224
The court emphasized the difference between compelling a subjective viewpoint
and compelling factual information.2 25 The court suggested that the MS4s increase
their own speech in response to the constitutionally permissible compulsion to
make a factual statement in the commercial marketplace. 6 Indeed the court went
on to compare the EPA regulation requiring that MS4s inform and educate the
public to the mercury disclosure requirement in Sorrell: "the Second Circuit held
that mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not
offend the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of
information or protecting individual liberty interests.2 2 7 The court noted that "the
policy considerations underlying the commercial speech treatment of labeling
requirements, see, e.g., the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1333-39, apply similarly in the context of the market-participant
municipal storm sewer provider." 228 There are numerous such regulations on the
books, and they all rely on the reasonable relationship test for their validity.
2 9
V. MENU LABEL LAWS
This Article's analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence with respect to
commercial disclosure requirements started off with the issue of menu label laws.
In order for a menu label law to be considered a valid factual disclosure
requirement such as those discussed throughout this Article, we must address each
step of the First Amendment analysis. First, menus (and menu boards) must be
considered a form of commercial speech. Second, menu label laws must be a form
of commercial disclosure requirements mandating the disclosure of factual
information. Finally, the menu label laws must pass the reasonable relationship test.
Opponents of menu label laws may compare the laws to governmental
compulsions of traditional speech. Such a far-reaching assertion seriously devalues
the importance of the First Amendment. In fact, the Supreme Court rejected a
similar argument in Rumsfeld v. FAIR:
Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other
recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is simply not the same as
forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a Jehovah's Witness to
224. Id. at 850 (quoting Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (upholding state
law protecting petitioning in malls and noting that "Barnette is inapposite because it involved the
compelled recitation of a message containing an affirmation of belief')).
225. Id. at 849-50.
226. See id. at 850.
227. Id. at 851 n.27 (quoting Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001)).
228. Id. at 851.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 192-199.
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display the motto 'Live Free or Die,' and it trivializes the freedom
protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest that it is.
230
The same rationale applies here. It is highly unlikely that a court would find that
menu label laws implicate traditional free speech rights.
Referring back to the discussion of a definition of commercial speech above,
it is very likely that a court would find that menus are a form of commercial
speech. Menus certainly propose a commercial transaction-even more so than
beer labels. 23' Further, although not properly advertisements, menus meet the
second and third part of the analysis in Bolger, as they refer to specific products,
and the food service establishment has an economic motivation for the speech.232
Menus provide factual information about the products offered and are related to the
economic interests of both the speaker and its audience, meeting the Central
Hudson requirements.233 In Bates, the Court found that lawyer advertisements
about the prices of routine services were commercial speech. 4 This is similar to a
menu of standard products offered for sale. It is fair to conclude that menus are a
form of commercial speech.
In order to determine whether a menu label law is a factual commercial
disclosure requirement, the information being mandated must be analyzed.
Opponents of menu label laws allege that they impermissibly compel a food service
establishment to voice a point of view with which they disagree.235 However, a
menu label law compels the disclosure of factual nutrition information about the
products offered for sale. Some require the disclosure of the total number of
calories in each product offered.236 A calorie is the "[a]mount of heat needed to
raise the temperature of 1 gram of water by 1 degree Celsius. ' ' 237 Some require the
disclosure of the total amount of saturated fat. Saturated fat is a "[flatty acid chain
that does not contain any carbon-to-carbon double bonds. 238 Others require the
disclosure of the total amount of carbohydrates.239 Carbohydrates "are composed of
the elements carbon (C), hydrogen (H), and oxygen (0)" and can be classified as
monosaccharides, disaccharides, or polysaccharides. 240  Others require the
230. 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006).
231. See generally Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
232. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
233. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980).
234. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 367-68, 383-84 (1977).
235. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rests. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 354
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, N.Y. State Rests. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009).
236. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
237. PETER S. MURANO, UNDERSTANDING FOOD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, at G-3 (2003).
238. Id. at G-16.
239. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
240. See MURANO, supra note 237, at 66-67.
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disclosure of the total amount of sodium. 4' Sodium is a mineral, which is an
inorganic substance listed on the periodic table of elements.242 This is the same
factual information that the NLEA requires food producers to disclose.243 These
requirements are the same information required on the Nutrition Facts Panel on
packaged food, which lists nutrition "facts." 24 There is nothing subjective about
the disclosure of these facts, and thus, listing them is not asserting any point of
view. Menu label laws compel the disclosure only of "purely factual and
uncontroversial" commercial information-the nutritional contents of restaurant
menu items.245
Menu label laws compel information disclosure in the commercial
marketplace similar to the disclosure requirements listed by Justice Stevens in his
concurrence in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company: the Surgeon General's Warning
labels on cigarettes, labeling requirements for food products, and labeling
requirements for drug products.246 Menu label laws require commercial actors to
disclose nutritional information about their products at the point of purchase. Like
all other labeling requirements, menu label laws require the information to be
conveyed prior to purchase in order to ensure consumer access to the information
during the decision-making process.247
Further, menu label laws do not prevent a restaurant from speaking an actual
point of view.2 48 First Amendment cases provide guidance on this point. In
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, peaceful political activists were advocating
their political views at an outdoor shopping center, against the Center's owners'
interests.249 The Supreme Court upheld their First Amendment right to do so and
suggested that the disgruntled owners "can expressly disavow any connection with
the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers
stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and
could explain that the persons are communicating their own messages by virtue of
241. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
242. See MURANO, supra note 237, at 75, 77.
243. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 2(a), 104 Stat. 2353,
2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006)).
244. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c) (2008).
245. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
246. 514 U.S. 476, 492 n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
247. United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedent supports the conclusion that
menu label laws are factual disclosure requirements. By comparing menu label laws to the regulation at
issue in United Foods, see Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Relief
and Preliminary Injunction, supra note 169, at 9, antagonists of such laws completely ignore the valid
precedents of Zauderer and Glic/knan, both of which are good law and stand on their own in contrast to
United Food. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415-16 (2001); Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
248. See Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 126, at 1581 (explaining that menu label laws only
require factual disclosure of information and not a subjective viewpoint).
249. 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980).
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state law."250 Restaurant owners can similarly put up signs stating that the
nutritional information is required by the governing authority mandating such
disclosure.
Likewise, in Meese v. Keene, the Court upheld the provision of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, which required labeling of certain films as "political
propaganda. ' 251 The Court said that "[d]isseminators of propaganda may go beyond
the disclosure required by statute and add any further information they think
germane to the public's viewing of the materials. '252 Likewise, restaurateurs who
are required to only post calories are free to add additional factual information to
their menus that they believe patrons should consider when making food selections.
The final issue to address is whether menu label laws are reasonably related to
the state's interest in passing them. The state has an interest in promoting public
health and an informed consumer population.253 It is reasonable for legislators and
public health departments to find that requiring restaurants to post nutrition
information is a valid tactic to address the nation's poor nutrition and drastic rise in
obesity. Governments have a substantial interest in protecting public health, and
specifically, reducing and preventing future obesity.254 They also have an interest
and a stake in reducing the cost of obesity and obesity-related diseases. 5 Menu
labels have the necessary objective of informing consumers of the nutritional
composition of the foods and beverages they purchase for consumption in order to
assist them in making choices better suited for their nutritional needs. Menu label
laws correct the information disparity that currently acts to the detriment of
consumers.
Because many menu label laws only require the disclosure of calorie
information,256 a separate but related question is whether targeting calories is
reasonably related to a state's interest in enacting these calorie-specific menu label
laws. As discussed above, leading authorities conclude that, at the minimum,
calories should be placed at the point of purchase.257 Experts consider calories to be
the single most important consideration for weight control.2 5 8 Studies confirm that
250. Id. at 87; see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 60, 65
(2006) (suggesting that a law school could put up signs or engage in protests in order to express their
views against the Solomon Amendment's equal access requirement for military recruiters).
251. 481 U.S. 465, 467, 479-80, 485 (1987).
252. Id. at481.
253. See Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 126, at 1580.
254. 1d. at 1579.
255. Id. at 1579-80.
256. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (2009); NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., HEALTH
CODE 24, § 81.50 (2006); S.B. 686, Leg. 2007, Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2007); H.B. 1203, 48th Leg., 1st Sess.
(N.M. 2007); S.B. 1696, Leg. 2007-2008, 105th Sess. (Tenn. 2007).
257. JEFFREY P. KOPLAN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 19, at 165-66.
258. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS
2005, at 15 (2005), available at http://www.healthierus.gov/dietaryguidelines (remarking that "when it
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consumers are unaware of and routinely underestimate the number of calories in
pre-prepared foods and beverages. 259 Moreover, not requiring a display of the entire
nutritional profile does not make the law constitutionally suspect. 260 Mandating the
disclosure of any piece of nutritional information adds to the overall information in
the commercial marketplace. The Court responded to a similar issue in Bates:
But it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the
information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information
needed to reach an informed decision .... Moreover, the argument
assumes that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the
limitations of advertising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance
than trusted with correct but incomplete information. We suspect the
argument rests on an underestimation of the public. In any event, we
view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public
ignorance.261
The same rationale applies to menu label laws. Menu label laws are similar to the
countless other factual disclosure requirements currently in the commercial
marketplace. They are one of many solutions to the obesity problem in the United
States. As such, they are subject to the Court's most lenient First Amendment test,
which they pass.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment's purpose is to protect against state intrusions on the
exposition of ideas in order to promote robust debate and protect against
interference of expression. This implies the right to be able to choose what to say
262
and what not to say. These highly valued ideals are at the core of the founding of
the United States.263 The Supreme Court extended this protection to commercial
comes to body weight control, it is calories that count-not the proportions of fat, carbohydrates and
proteins in the diet"); OBESITY WORKING GROUP, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 13 (finding
"a focus on total calories is the most useful single piece of information in relation to managing weight");
AM. MED. ASS'N, HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES: H-150.945
NUTRITION LABELING AND NUTRITIONALLY IMPROVED MENU OFFERINGS IN FAST-FOOD AND OTHER
CHAIN RESTAURANTS, 140 (2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/Hlth-
Ethics.pdf (stating that "at a minimum, calories [should be labeled] on menu boards since they have
limited space").
259. See RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, YALE UNIV., supra note 27, at 9; Burton et al.,
supra note 27, at 1671, 1674.
260. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985) ("[Wle are
unpersuaded by appellant's argument that a disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is 'under-
inclusive'-that is, if it does not get all facts of the problem it is designed to ameliorate. As a general
matter, governments are entitled to attack problems piecemeal, save where their policies implicate rights
so fundamental that strict scrutiny must be applied.").
261. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977).
262. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988).
263. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).
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speech in a limited sense in order to enrich the commercial marketplace. 26 More
information about goods and services enable consumers to make informed
decisions, strengthening the free market economy.265 It is absurd to evoke these
core First Amendment principles in the case of menu label laws or to refute
commercial disclosure requirements, in general. The First Amendment was not
intended to protect corporations from being compelled to disclose the contents of
their goods for sale to consumers.
Even if the Supreme Court continues to interpret the First Amendment's
protection for commercial speech more broadly, it could not, consistent with any
First Amendment jurisprudence, disrupt the ability of the government to require
commercial entities from disclosing factual information about their products and
services. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment means
that mandating more, not less information, is constitutionally protected and
preferred.266
The status quo with respect to restaurant foods is a true information disparity
to the detriment of consumers. Our country values informed consumers in order to
strengthen the free market economy;267 commercial disclosure requirements further
this purpose.268 The current regulatory system in the United States is based on these
values.269 Many disclosure requirements are enacted to ensure an informed
consumer population with the goal of protecting public health and safety.27° Menu
label laws extend the public health rationale of current labeling requirements to
food service establishments. Targeting chain restaurants aims to address the public
health problem associated with restaurants that serve predominately inexpensive
264. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
("Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information.").
265. See 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006) (explaining in the context of package labeling that "[iunformed
consumers are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a free market economy"); see also Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) ("it is a matter
of public interest that [private economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed
.... And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also
indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated.").
266. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'1 Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994)
(explaining that disclosure of truthful information makes a positive contribution to the decision making
process); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 ("[T]he First Amendment presumes that some accurate
information is better than no information at all.").
267. See 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006) ("Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient
functioning of a free market economy. Packages and their labels should enable consumers to obtain
accurate information as to the quantity of the contents and should facilitate value comparisons.").
268. See id.
269. See id. (declaring that the Congressional policy for trade and commerce is to encourage
dissemination of information to educate the consumer thereby promoting fair and efficient functioning
of the free market economy).
270. See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
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and highly caloric food to extensive populations.271 Consumers are being supplied
with an overabundance of non-nutritious, energy-dense foods 272 and must be given
the tools to make informed decisions about food consumption. Public health
necessity dictates that this disclosure requirement becomes as pervasive and
reliable as information on packaged foods and beverages throughout the country.
271. See generally Forrest Andrews, Small Bites: Obesity Lawsuits Prepare to Take on the Fast
Food Industry, 15 ALB. L.J. SCi. & TECH. 153 (2004) (explaining the various methods with which the
public, legislators, and courts have addressed the fast food industry's contribution to the obesity
problem).
272. See generally id. at 158-59 (discussing the prominence of harmful trans fatty acids in popular
fast foods).
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